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Abstract 
This discussion is focused on urban deve10pment in advanced industria1 
nations over the past thirty years. Ten cities are se1ected and these include New 
Y ork， Detroit， Houston， Toronto， Live叩001，Glasgow， Paris， Marseilles， Milan 
and Nap1es. The cities were chosen because they represent prosperous and 
distressed cities within each of five nations (United States， Canada， United 
Kingdom， France and Ita1y). The cities por仕aya wide range of urban policy 
responses and these resoponses are used to ana1yze successes and failures. 
Propositions are advanced that 1) cities have undergone very different 
changes and taken different deve10pment paths 2) globalization has profound1y 
affected cities and shaped their deve10pment strategies 3) certain characteristics 
and strategies enab1e cities to better cope with global transformation. After 
reviewing these characteristics an observation is made that there is an inherent 
tension between effective development strategies and socially redistributive 
policies. 
The discussion is concluded with recommendations for the most effective 
development strategies in an era of globalization. The recommendations are 
intended to apply to Tokyo as well as other advanced cities. 
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The subject for my talk this aftemoon will be “Urban Development in a Global Era"， a 
comparative study of North America and Westem Europe. 1 wi1 talk about 10 cities and 1 hope 
you can draw some inferences for Tokyo. 1 wi1 be phrasing my talk in a very general way so 
that you can draw some points for Tokyo. 
Let me begin by saying that the last 30 years had been an extraordinary time for us， 
particularly from the year 1970 up through the coming new mi1ennium. They were years of 
considerable transformation. The ancient wor1d took 3，000 years to emerge. The medieval wor1d 
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took 1，000 years to emerge and the industrial age， just 100 years. And now from 1970 on 
through the next millennium， we will be facing a postindustrial age， which wil1 emerge even 
more rapidly than the previous eras. 
The change is geometric and so rapid. In just 30 years we have moved more rapidly than in 
the previous 4，100 years. We can understand the movement of the ancient world simply by 
understanding the technologically driving forces which propelled one age to another age. The 
forces of energy for the ancient and medieval world were essentially either man-made or 
animal-driven energy. The forces of the industrial world were driven by the energy and 
technology of the steam engine and of electric power and of coal power. 
The forces of the post-industrial age are driven by cyber space， fiber optic technology and 
microchips. It is this age， from roughly 1970 onwards， that has transformed cities and caused a 
virtual revolution in the urban world. If we look at the major cities across the world we can 
understand just what has occurred in those places. Cities such as Pittsburgh and Cleveland in 
America， heavy-industrial cities， orBirmingham， New Cast1e， Essen， Li1e， Turin in Western 
Europe， virtually revolutionalized their social and economic fabric. These were cities that once 
contained heavy industries. Many of the cities which created steel and bui1t automobi1es have 
been left virtually empty. They have lost nearly 50% of their employment， and in many cases， 
50% of their population. 
Those were not only the heavy-industrial cities of steel， automobi1e， machinery and tool-
10，000，000 
NewYork Milan 
9，000，000 
8，000，000 
7，000，000 
6，000，000 
5，000，000 
4，000，000 
3，000，000 
2，000，000 
1，000，000 
D 
Changes City Agg C旬 勾 Cily Agg Cily Agg C耐Agg C町 Agg CiIy Agg CiIy Agg C町 Agg CiIy Agg 
In -47% ・9.3弛 6.0% 49.0% .11.1 % 43.3% 28.4鳴 46.3% -48.2% -12.0% -64.8% -23.3% -6.8% -2.2% -9.8% 16.3% -26.4% 3.5% -14.9% 10.1% 
Oensity 
Cities and Agglomerations with Changes in Population Densities 
Figure1 Population Growth and Loss in Ten Cities : 1970 -1990 
Savitch : Urban Development in a GlobaI Era 145 
making， but they also consisted of port cities that hosted warehousing and shipping. Port cities 
such as Liverpool， Glasgow， Marseille and Hamburg went through this emphatic revolution. 
The old industrial age in many of these cities is gone. And it has gone to in many cases to 
the Southeast Asia and other places. Manufacturing and ports have decentralized but 
nonetheless， there has been a re-centralization of the service economy and the information 
economy， the econom y of management， finance and direction. 
We can see this in the rise of what has recently being called ‘globalcities'. Cities such as 
New York's Midtown and Downtown; Cities such as London's Inner City and the Docklands; 
La Defense in Paris; Frankfurt's Central Business District and Tokyo， of course， has its 
Shinjuku Area. 
One part of the story of this great transformation can been attributed to the phenomenon we 
cal 'globalization'. We can define globalization as a phenomenon which has brought about the 
permeability of national boundaries. National boundaries are no longer wal1s through which 
people have difficulty passing but they are now perforated. Nations are no longer islands 
themselves， and nations are tied together in very intricate ways. 
We can think of this new era of globalization in terms of three basic dimensions; economic， 
technological and social. I've already mentioned the technological aspect: the growth of 
computer usage， the rise of microchips， the rise of everything from e-mai1 to the technology of 
the common news media such as CNN that everybody faces. But there are other aspects that 
complement the great technological revolution. The increasing amount of trade that now 
blanketed the world are due to trading pacts such as :the European Union (EU); NAFTA in 
North America; or ASEAN in Southeast Asia. They have changed the very nature of national 
sovereignty. 
Free trade and the adoptions of common cuロencyhave lessened the role of the national 
state， have perforated sovereignty and in doing so， they have increased the roles of cities and the 
roles of city regions. Once common currencies are adopted， once common interest rates are 
adopted， once common trading standards are adopted， the roles of nation states diminish. One 
thing that becomes important is the abi1ity of cities engaged in， for good or bad， more intense 
economic competition. We can see economic competition even in standardization of products， 
common we 
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sizeable waves of immigrants. Even Tokyo， which is supposedly one of the most homogenous 
cities of the wor1d， has over 250 thousand immigrants who now sta旺thenew economic 
machinery. 
Immigrants are often used for a source of cheap labor， and a source of establishing informal 
economies. So one can see businessmen heading to the central cities during the day and 
immigrants going out to serve as maids， housekeepers or as day workers in residential areas， a 
kind of reverse commute. During the evening as the business people go back to their residential 
units， those same immigrants return to the central city. They may and be c1eaning office 
bui1dings， and working in menial or cheap labor jobs during the evening. 
Let me provide you with some examples. More than 10 percent of the entire population of 
Germany and France now consists of what are called ‘immigrants' or‘guest workers'， very 
often from Turkey， orfrom parts of the underdeveloped wor1d. Sao Paulo has 1 mi1ion foreign 
immigrants used to staff its economy. Bangkok has over 500 thousand immigrants most1y 
drawn from Southeast Asia to staff its economic infrastructure. 
Immigration is a very different type of social movement. Fifteen years ago or 100 years 
ago， when people immigrated， they usually assimi1ated into the host culture. People became 
Americans or Australians， orFrench. But this new immigration consists heavi1y of single men 
who send their remuneration back to their home country. Even when the fami1ies are brought 
over they remain unassimi1ated. We can say that immigrants now live in a kind of transnational 
space. Turkish immigrants living in Ber1in or Paris retain very strong ties to their home. 
Hispanics in Chicago or New York are very c10sely tied to Central or South America. 
So these are expressions of globalism. The abi1ity of immigrants to moveacross countries 
and settle in a land as if it were a part of their homeland. The abi1ity of economic growth that 
moves transnationally from one city to another without recognizing where they even came from. 
The force of technology and media to contracts distances between many different countries and 
cultures. 
So it is not， 1 should say， just deindustrialization. It is not just globalism that now 
characterizes this new age. But there is a third factor which current1y drives this new age and 
that is urban decentralization. Very often this is expressed， atleast in America， asa growth of 
suburbs. 
So we n 
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This is what the 1ast 30 years have given us and is like1y to be propelled at an even more 
rapid rate toward the next millennium. The question of my research concerns how major cities 
of the wor1d have coped with this transition. Why have some cities been very successfu1 in 
dealing with this transition whi1e other cities have fallen behind. What 1 have done as a part of 
this research enterprise is to 100k at 10 cities in North America and Western Europe. Again 1 
invite you to draw paralle1 with Japanese cities， particu1ar1y Tokyo. 
The 10 cities chosen for the study are: Detroit， Houston， New York and Toronto in North 
America; Glasgow and Live中001in United Kingdom; Paris and Marsei1e inFrance; Mi1an and 
Nap1es in Ita1y. They were se1ected for severa1 reasons. Many were se1ected because in each 
nation we have prospering cities and cities in dec1ine. So we wi1 have Detroit which has been 
shown to be a city in great decline versus Houston， which is a prosper city. In the United 
Kingdom， Live中001went through a period of dec1ine but has recent1y revived itself. Glasgow 
remains in great distress. In France we have Paris， considered to be a prosper city and Marsei1le， 
considered as a city in dec1ine. In Ita1y we have Mi1an， a prosperous city and Nap1es， a city in 
dec1ine. 
So the object of this study is to try to understand why it is， that some cities even in the same 
nation have prospered whi1e others have gone through dec1ine in this era of turmoi1. The second 
important objective is that we wanted to incorporate different types of cities so that we have 
Houston and Toronto which represent a new-age boom town. Next 1 shou1d say that some of 
these cities are metrop01itan cities much 1ike Tokyo. New York of course is a metropolitan city 
and Toronto represents a metrop01itan-type city. 
We tried to establish and tried to exp1ain the reasons why certain cities are successfu1. 1 wi1 
get to that toward the end of this ta1k but 1et me say that before that， we 100ked at severa1 
factors. One is their economic strategy; two is their market conditions， and three is the set of 
inter-governmenta1 re1ations. Market conditions refer to the abi1ity of the city to attract private 
capita1 and investment. Economic strategy refers to the abi1ty of the city to deve10p and 
approach toward g10balism and the degree to which the city wi1 spend its resources on either 
socia1 expenditures or in attracting outsideinvestors. We ask the question: Is the city 
market-ce 
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cities relative to the three variables of market conditions， economic strategy and 
inter-governmental relations. 
Now let me show you what happened to these 10 cities during these 30 years， orduring this 
age of very radical transformation (Figure 2). The figures represent secondary sector change in 
these 10 cities. By secondary sector it basical1y means manufacturing， heavy industry， transport 
and utilities. What we have listed here in very short terms， the decline in most of these cities， at
least in 8 of these 10 cities， of heavy manufacturing that 1 have described earlier. We have the 
cities listed here as we11 as the agglomeration (that is the suburb around the city). 
So you will see that in cities like Detroit， more than half of its manufacturing capability was 
lost. And look at some other distressed cities. In Glasgow more than half of its manufacturing 
capability was lost and in Liverpool， again more than half. In Paris， more than half or probably 
70 percent of its manufacturing capability was lost and disappeared. In Marseille， same thing 
and Milan too， more than half lost. 
The second bar shows the aggregation. Naples lost less， about 40 percent of its 
manufacturing capability in these 30 years. 1'1 add just one thing. You can see that new-age 
boom towns had not lost that much; Houston has lost a litle， Toronto has not lost al1 that much. 
So you have two exceptions to this steep decline in almost every major cities that we have 
selected. 
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Figure 2 Secondary Sector Change in Ten Cities: 1970 -1990 
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Now the question is what happened to these cities as a result of lost industry. We can obtain 
an answer by looking at their ability to recover with what is called here tertiary sector 
employment. That is a kind of employment that 1 said was very characteristic of the new global 
era and may inc1ude services， high technology and very often what we cal “FIREヘfinance，
insurance and real estate. 
Notice the most severely struck cities like Detroit have even lost the additional tertiary 
sector employment. The same is true here for Glasgow. Marsei1e lost as well. Naples had a 
slight gain. The big gainers are Houston and look at New York City which continued to gain 
from the 1970s to 1990. If you isolate Manhattan from New York the gain wi1 be even higher. 
The agglomeration gained as well. A great deal of tertiary sector growth not only occurs in 
central cities but it occurs else into the suburban areas. Toronto gained in both manufacture and 
tertiary sector. Paris gained quite a bit. Mi1an gains here as well. But notice that the typical 
pattern， both in terms of population increase and in terms of tertiary sector growth， isconstituted 
by a spread of that activity into surrounding suburbs which makes collaboration with 
surrounding localities important for al central cities. 
Here's another view. Of these cities which bring the point into sha中erre1ief. It is the 
occupational transformation of these cities between 1970 and 1990. So we have here essentially 
high degree of post国industrialemployment， professionals， managers， sales c1erks， and services 
which we label as post-industrial employment. And here we have pre-post司industrial
employment of craftsmen and operators in the old industrial cities. I'm soηY to say that this is a 
work in progress and these categories for Mi1an and Naples are not fi1ed in yet. But note here， 
again in distressed cities， they have actually fallen. If we take Detroit， from near1y 78 percent 
down to 70 percent in these categories. If we look again at Glasgow， we see a litle rise and in 
Liverpool too， but basically under 70 percent. In Paris， by contrast， orin other prosperous cities， 
they are hitting near1y 80 percent， upwards of 75 percent of their employment base as 
post-industrial employment. Houston has about 76 percent. New York City has over 80 percent 
in post-industrial employment. 
See Figure 3 below. 
So the part of the answer to the question， what happened to some of the old industrial c 
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Figure 3 Tertiary Sector Change in Ten Cities : 1970 -1990 
or upon ports and warehousing. Once a single industry moves elsewhere or becomes outmoded 
the city fals far behind. This was certainly the case for Liverpool. When trade between England 
and North America so to did Liverpool. And certainly it was the case with Marseille as other 
more competitive ports opened up through the south of France. 
So in terms of market conditions， versatility is a great asset， the ability to have multiple 
industries that you can rely upon. But that does not stil account for the success or the failure. 
1nter-govemmental relations， that is to say， the ability to draw on strength from complementary 
sources also explains for the success. 
1n New York City for example， a large corporation run by the state in cooperation with 
larger regions， called the Urban Development Corporation， invested huge amount of money to 
rehabilitate midtown and downtown areas. 1n Paris regional cooperation and national forces 
were brought to bear in order to build a new downtown outside the center of Paris in an area 
called La Defense. Toronto is not nearly severely struck by deindustrialization but nonetheless 
had an enormous network of localities around that supported economic and social cooperation. 
Both economic fabric and infrastructure of that city were through the 1970s， giving that 
metropolitan are one of the best transportation systems in North America. 
Detroit and Liverpool fel apart and virtually collapsed. And in Detroit riots after 1967 
brought about a huge amount of flight of the white middle-class and left that city today with an 
impoverishment rate among the highest in North America. Neither the suburbs nor the state of 
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Michigan would have much to do with Detroit. People fled and tried to create an altemative 
city. White middle-class suburbs were virtually cut off from the central city. 
Liverpool different as it is from Detroit and thousands of miles away， experienced much the 
same phenomena. The city was cut off from the outlying areas and a group of radical labor 
politicians called the Militant Tendency took over the city and tried to spend it into bankruptcy， 
believing that if the city went bankrupt the national govemment would come and save it. But it 
did not. So Liverpool too is cut off both from national aid and from regional aid around it. 
So the force of inter-govemmental cooperation can often revive the city. But this too does 
not tel the ful tale. Now here is the third proposition 1 would like to offer to you. There are 
inherent tensions between the willingness to invest in economic development by tracking 
outside investors and the willingness of the city to spend on social causes --on redistribution. 
There is a basic contradiction that many cities face between devoting resources toward 
economic development and devoting resources toward social spending. 
Social expenditures will reduce poverty or at least make poverty more tolerable. But social 
expenditures tend also to dampen economic growth because it taxes the middle class， and the 
middle class are often the producers of that economic development. Let me show you some data 
here which may make the case. These are the poverty rates in some of our cities. We are stil in 
the process of filling in the chart. Detroit， 32% poverty， Houston， 20%， New York 18%. Poverty 
at least in American central cities is much higher than in Toronto or Marseille. So in spite of 
economic growth， poverty increased between 1970 and 1990 in American cities. We can 
understand poverty increasing in Detroit to 32%. But why should it increase in Houston or in 
New York， from 14% to 20% and from 14% to 18% is stil an unanswered. 
In spite of prosperity one can have poverty. If you look at unemployment rates， here the 
data is more complete， note here that unemployment rates are less in North American cities， 
Houston and New York being two cases， 8 and 9% of unemployment， and has gone down since 
then. Detroit remains high at 17% but note that， inspite of the fact that European cities have 
Table 1 Persons in poverty in 10 Cities: 1970 -1990 
Detroit 
Houston 
NewYork 
Toronto 
Glasgow 
Liverpool 
Paris 
Marseilles 
Milan 
出世主
Central City 
1970 1990 
14.9% 32.0% 
14.1% 
14.9% 
14.5% 
20.4% 
18.9% 
16.0% 
14.9% 
4% (est) 
22% (est) 
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1esser poverty， they a1so have higher unemployment rates which is a paradox. The rate in 
Glasgow is 19%， and in Live中00115%and Paris 11 %， Marseille18% and Milan， mere 9% but 
considerably higher than in American cities. So the paradox is poverty higher in America but 
unemployment lower in America. 
Table 2 Proportion of Assisted to 
1970 1990 
Detroit 3.1% 12.1% 
Houston 1.5% 5.7% 
New York 8.5% 14.1% 
Toronto 15.5% 
Glasgow 53.9% 51.3% 
Liverpool 44.6% 37.3% 
Paris 20.8% 21.0% 
Marseilles 46.3% 
Milan 4.14% 13.5% 
Naples 8.69% 12.2% 
The answer of course to this dilemma is the fact that many of these cities and many of the 
nationa1 governments have a high 1evel of assistance in West European cities so that they have a 
greater degree of social redistribution in West European cities than those exist in the United 
States. And cities themse1ves in Western Europe take on higher redistribution釦nctionthan they 
do in North America. In other words， the American cities tend to be more market-centered and 
Western European cities， including Toronto， tend to be more socially-centered. 
Look for example at this table here which shows the proportion of assisted housing in each 
of these cities. In Detroit， Houston and New York the proportion is relatively low， aslitle as 
only 5% in the city like Houston which is the most market-centered city of al of the cities that 
we have studied. It is a litle higher in Detroit， and stil higher in New York at 14%， But look at 
these rates here in Glasgow， Liverpool， Paris and Marseille， anywhere between 20% to as much 
as 51 <?る.So we found that once cities begin in a very strong way to try to redistribute their 
wea1th for social activities， it places a certain strain on their ability to grow in terms of economic 
prosperity. So in this wake of global transformation， the march to poverty may be more 
bearable， more tolerable in at least in socially-oriented cities but the march to prosperity in the 
market-centered cities is far more vigorous. 
Finally， 1 offer the idea that in an era of globalism， cities must be competitive， must be 
nimble and quick and act in an economically aggressive manner. The best prescription for 
success in the global era is to have an economic strategy of low taxes， yet a high degree of 
inter-governmental aid， and promote favorable market conditions. New York and Toronto 
represent the best examples of that with Paris a distant third. 
The worst prescription is to have no inter-governmenta1 cooperation， tosustain poor existing 
market conditions， and to have a strong redistributive policies. Liverpool represents the most 
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disadvantaged city of the entire selection of ten followed by Detroit and Marseille. 
This may not be a representation of the world as we would like， but it is the world as we 
have it. And 1 can only hope my remarks will enable us to function as best as we possibly can 
within the world as it is. 1 thank you for your presence and for your kind invitation to me. It 
has been a pleasure and privilege to address you. 
